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	ABSTRACT 
Climate change presents a wicked problem for coastal planners and policy 
makers (Lazarus, 2008) that transcends political boundaries and involves complex 
social and infrastructure networks (R. Biesbroek, Termeer, Kabat, & Klostermann, 
2009). Traditional ways of thinking, problem solving, and policy making must be 
transformed (R. Biesbroek et al., 2009). Leadership is acknowledged as critical to 
solving complex problems (G. R. Biesbroek, Klostermann, Termeer, & Kabat, 2013; 
Eisenack et al., 2014; Meijerink & Stiller, 2013; Stiller & Meijerink, 2015). Complex 
infrastructure and social systems will need to undergo “transformational adaptation” 
in response to rising seas and stronger storms (Kates, Travis, & Wilbanks, 2012). 
Many stakeholders across various jurisdictional boundaries and at all levels of 
government will need to play a role (Kates et al., 2012). This research explores the 
port of Providence community’s perceptions around the responsibility to lead in 
resilience planning and systemic transformational change, specifically evaluating 
gaps between stakeholders and those expected to lead the change. We found that 
stakeholder perceptions of adaptation leadership contribute to an institutional void, in 
which it is unclear who is responsible and who pays for resilience investment. This 
research emphasizes the need for pre-planning dialogue in the face of wicked 
problems in order to develop consensus for resilience investment strategies. Pre-
planning allows clarification of stakeholder roles and politically, economically, and 
socially feasible resilience options can be identified. 	  
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1.1 Problem Statement 
Climate change presents a wicked problem for coastal planners and policy makers 
(Lazarus, 2008) that transcends political boundaries and involves complex social and 
infrastructure networks (Biesbroek, Termeer, Kabat, & Klostermann, 2009). Traditional 
ways of thinking, problem solving, and policy making must be transformed (Biesbroek et 
al., 2009). Leadership is acknowledged as critical to solving complex problems 
(Biesbroek, Klostermann, Termeer, & Kabat, 2013; Eisenack et al., 2014; Meijerink & 
Stiller, 2013; Stiller & Meijerink, 2015). Complex infrastructure and social systems will 
need to undergo “transformational adaptation” in response to rising seas and stronger 
storms (Kates et al., 2012). Many stakeholders across various jurisdictional boundaries 
and at all levels of government will need to play a role (Kates et al., 2012). This research 
explores one seaport community’s perceptions around the responsibility to lead in 
resilience planning and systemic transformational change, specifically evaluating gaps 





2. Literature Review and Background 
2.1 Background 
Seaports comprise complex coastally located systems inherently vulnerable to 
climate impacts (Becker et al., 2013; Bender et al., 2010; Emanuel, 2013; Tebaldi, 
Strauss, & Zervas, 2012). Sea level rise and surge flooding associated with climate 
change intensified tropical storms present a complex problem to seaports. Though 
resilience planning has become more prevalent globally, few resilience measures have 
been implemented in the U.S. (Moser & Ekstrom, 2010, 2011), or in the world’s ports 
(Becker, Inoue, Fischer, & Schwegler, 2012).  
The planning process can be hindered by a wide variety of barriers defined as 
“obstacles that can be overcome with concerted effort, creative management change of 
thinking, prioritization, and related shifts in resources, land uses, institutions, etc.” 
(Moser & Ekstrom, 2010, p. 22027). Effective leadership can help break down some of 
these barriers (Moser & Ekstrom, 2010). Planners and policy makers need better 
information on how barriers are formed including causes (Biesbroek et al., 2013) and 
entry points (Eisenack et al., 2014), including research directed at understanding how 
insufficient leadership influences barriers.  
Using the business and regulatory stakeholder group at the Port of Providence in 
Providence, R.I., we asked port stakeholders who they felt had a responsibility to lead in 
resilience planning and implementation. Then using an evaluative framework, we asked 
the leaders to react to stakeholder perceptions as well as evaluate their leadership role. 
The purpose of this study was to examine whether or not gaps exist between business 
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stakeholder and regulatory stakeholder perceptions of leadership responsibility and how 
such gaps might contribute to resilience barriers. 
 Climate change, resulting sea level rise and increased tropical storm 
activity pose a significant threat to seaports. By 2100, scientists project a doubling in the 
frequency of category four and five hurricanes (Bender et al., 2010), as well as increases 
in wind and surge produced by these storms (Emanuel, 2013; Tebaldi et al., 2012). Ports 
by their nature are located at the interface between land and sea, leaving them inherently 
vulnerable to sea level rise and storm impacts (Becker, Matson, Fischer, & Mastrandrea, 
2014). This presents a “wicked problem” that transcends traditional problem solving and 
policy processes because they involve multiple stakeholders across multiple jurisdictions 
at all governmental levels (Biesbroek et al., 2009)  The cost of problem solving is felt 
early, but benefits are often not seen until far in the future. Wicked problems require 
changes in thinking and changes in problem solving processes (Lazarus, 2008). 
Future major storm events, on the scale of Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm 
Sandy, are likely to impair port operations and have a major impact on U.S. economies at 
all scales, local to global (Becker et al., 2014; Neumann et al., 2014; Nicholls & 
Cazenave, 2010). Extreme weather events such as hurricanes result in multiple direct, 
indirect, and intangible consequences (Becker et al., 2014). These include damages to 
port facilities, equipment, and buildings; loss of business for port tenants; cost of cleanup 
and emergency response; loss of jobs; environmental damages; and impacts to quality of 
life (A. Becker et al., 2014). The Port of Providences has a history of close calls as well 
as two near direct landfalls (Appendix 1, Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency, 
2014). 
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Hurricane impacts reach beyond the port area to regional economies through 
supply chain disruptions (A. Becker et al., 2012, 2014; Hallegatte, 2008; Koetse & 
Rietveld, 2009). Economic impacts of port activity reach far beyond the port. In 2011, 
U.S. ports handled 53% of U.S. imports and 38% of U.S. exports by value via 62,000 
vessel calls (Chambers & Liu, 2013). In 2014, the U.S. port system supported over 23 
million jobs (direct, indirect, and induced); approximately $4.6 trillion in total economic 
value, and approximately $3.2 billion in tax revenue (American Assocaition of Port 
Authorities, 2015). Port closures, shipment delays, and other impacts as a consequence of 
hurricane damage have the potential to displace and reduce ports economic benefit 
(Hallegatte, 2008). 
As part of resilient intermodal transportation systems, resilient ports provide 
economic benefit to regions and nations (Southworth, Hayes, McLeod, & Strauss-
Wieder, 2014). They also provide researchers a defined space to study gaps in 
stakeholder perception of leadership in the face of wicked problems, because port 
systems include multiple stakeholders across various levels of government and 
jurisdiction (Becker et al., 2014; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997 Notteboom & 
Winklemans, 2002; Stewart, 2014; Winklemans & Notteboom, 2007). Previous work 
used stakeholder-based methods to identify possible resilience strategies within seaport 
systems. Becker and Caldwell (2015) focused specifically on identifying possible 
resilience strategies within the port communities of Gulfport, Miss. and Providence, R.I. 
Understanding a suite of options is important to improving resilience, but it is a long path 
from understanding options to implementation of resilience strategies. 
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The Rockefeller Foundation 100 Resilient Cities Program defines resilience as 
“the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses, and systems within a 
city to survive adapt, and grow no matter what kinds of chronic stresses and acute shocks 
they experience” (The Rockerfeller Foundation, 2015, p. 2). The Foundation also 
highlights leadership and strategy, in which successful leadership “promotes leadership 
and effective management, empowers a broad range of stakeholders, and fosters long-
term and integrated planning (The Rockefeller Foundation, 2015, p. 2)”. 
“Transformational adaptation” such as the construction of flood barriers, the elevation of 
entire seaports, or the relocation of infrastructure to less vulnerable locations are complex 
resilience strategies; effective management through strong leadership and strategy is need 
to promote long-term and holistic planning efforts. 
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Adaptation Leadership 
Adaptation leaders are defined here as “those that will implement climate 
resilience strategies in complex systems such as ports”. From the literature, adaptation 
leaders are individuals, an organization, or a group of organizations that help complete 
the resilience implementation process by facilitating functions within a group of 
stakeholders (Meijerink & Stiller, 2013; Moser & Ekstrom, 2010, 2011; Stiller & 
Meijerink, 2015). The functions include but are not limited to setting deadlines, sourcing 
and allocating resources, disseminating information, and connecting stakeholders. 
Adaptation leaders also display certain behaviors that build trust and encourage 
stakeholder participation (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, & Fetter, 1990). These 
behaviors include but are not limited to acting as a role model, encouraging out of the 
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box thinking and intellectual thought, and providing one-on-one support to stakeholders. 
These actions and behaviors reduce the impact of barriers to adaptation (Moser & 
Ekstrom, 2010).  In this section we better define adaptation leadership. 
Rarely does any singular agent have the absolute power to make major 
transformational change to a complex system like a seaport (Kates et al., 2012). 
Leadership is more likely to emerge from certain stakeholders that motivate and sustain 
the participation of other stakeholders (Stiller & Meijerink, 2015). A collective leadership 
is considered important for navigating around policy barriers, and it can help overcome 
barriers when a lack of mandates, resources, information, and authorization exist 
(Biesbroek et al., 2009; Karlsson, Parker, Hjerpe, & Linnér, 2011; Meijerink & Stiller, 
2013, 2013; Moser & Ekstrom, 2010; Stiller & Meijerink, 2015). Adaption leadership can 
also help develop consensus around decisions in which many stakeholders are presented 
with multiple resilience options (Becker, 2016; Biesbroek et al., 2013; Karlsson et al., 
2011; Vogel, Moser, Kasperson, & Dabelko, 2007).  
Stiller and Meijerink (2015) describe five functions of leadership: political-
administrative function, an enabling function, an adaptive function, a dissemination 
function and a connective function. In this study, we use these functions as a guide to help 
stakeholder-identified leaders assess and report on their own leadership responsibility 
(Section 3.3). Since adaptation leaders are expected to bring about transformational 
change we can expect that they might have transformational leadership qualities. 
Transformational leaders often display the ability to articulate a vision, provide a model 
of behavior, promote cooperation among members of a group, expect high performance 
of community members, and provide individual support and intellectual stimulation. 
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These behaviors enhance trust between leaders and stakeholders, increasing participation 
and leading to more favorable change (Podsakoff et al., 1990). For more information on 
adaptation leadership see Appendix 3. 
Past studies have examined which organizations are responsible for leading 
adaption for large systems such as ports. Becker and Caldwell (2015) suggest that state 
and local authorities are largely responsible for planning and implementing adaptation 
strategies and that Long-range planning (like transformational adaptation) is best fit 
under state purview (Becker & Caldwell, 2015). Our study investigates who at the Port of 
Providence is perceived as responsible to lead such long-range resilience and adaptation 
planning activities.  
2.2.2 Barriers relation to leadership 
Researchers have identified many barriers to resilience planning created by 
leadership including intuitional void, fragmentation, and insufficient leadership 
(Biesbroek et al. (2009), Moser & Ekstrom (2010), Stiller & Meijerink (2015)). An 
institutional void is when “there is no clear division of who decides” or “who is 
responsible” (Biesbroek et al., 2009, 7). Institutional void does not just mean there is no 
decision maker, it can be seen when there is a lack of decision making structure or when 
the mechanisms and processes of decision making do not exist (Biesbroek et al., 2009). 
Such a void can happen when decision makers are presented with new, un-before-seen 
challenges, such as the results of climate change. 
 Fragmentation, a barrier similar to institutional void, occurs when there are 
multiple stakeholders able to act to make change to a system, but no one party takes the 
lead or there are multiple disjointed efforts (Biesbroek et al., 2009; Moser & Ekstrom, 
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2010). For example, the Port of Providence is made up of multiple business owners and 
each owner has some flexibility to alter their existing property. They also have the choice 
to support and participate, or oppose and obstruct other actions or planning processes. 
Fragmentation occurs when it is not clear who should be making decision and who 
should be acting to make change.  
Leadership can be a cross-cutting issue, meaning it has the potential to both break 
down and to create barriers throughout the policy process (Moser & Ekstrom, 2010). 
Barriers caused by insufficient leadership and the lack of a decision-making structure 
benefit from increased dialogue (Douglas et al., 2011). Dialogue throughout various 
stages of the resilience process motivate leadership by instilling ownership, expectation, 
and accountability (Moser & Ekstrom, 2011). Dialogue through early engagement 
increases trust and motivates participation in the planning process (Douglas et al., 2011) 
by elevating the stature of the resilience process and those involved (Moser & Ekstrom, 
2011). An example of this dialogue is pre-planning. Pre-planning is a process the engages 
stakeholders in problem solving before any management decisions are made (Becker, In 
press). These process are often facilitated by boundary-spanning organizations (Preston, 
Rickards, Dessai, & Meyer, 2013; Tribbia & Moser, 2008). 
Boundary-spanning organizations or individuals co-exist with decision-making 
organizations, but do not have any formal decision-making authority (Tribbia & Moser, 
2008). Universities and research institutes are examples. These organizations transcend 
jurisdictions and act as translators between different stakeholder groups (Tribbia & 
Moser, 2008; Vogel et al., 2007). Pre-planning brings together different stakeholder 
groups, translates information between stakeholder groups, facilitate collaboration, and 
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provide mediation services (Tribbia & Moser, 2008). Pre-planning processes allow for 
dialogue around un-before-discussed risks, the political, economic, and social feasibility 
of resilience options, and roles of stakeholders within the community, without laying 
blame or calling out any specific organization (Becker, In Press). We propose that pre-
planning phases of climate resilience decision-making motivate leaders and allow for a 
clarification of leadership roles, which by doing so reduces the impact of barriers in the 
resilience process (Moser & Ekstrom, 2011) Pre-planning dialogue can also motivate the 
participation of those responsible to lead (Douglas et al., 2011; Moser & Ekstrom, 2011). 
Barriers are likely to be seen in port stakeholder networks in the face of complex 
and never-before-seen challenges. This study examines how stakeholders perceive 
leadership responsibility. It then proposes strategies to break down barriers to effective 
planning for resilience. It does so by addressing three research questions through 
interviews and surveys of stakeholders of the Port of Providence, Rhode Island. 
2.3 Research Questions 
1. Are there differences in who public and private stakeholders see as responsible for 
leading resilience implementation at the Port of Providence? 
2. Are there differences in how stakeholders and who stakeholders perceive as 
responsible to lead resilience implementation see the responsibility to lead 
resilience implementation at the Port of Providence?  
3. What barriers do leaders see as inhibiting their leadership role for climate 
resilience in the Port of Providence? 	  
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3. Methods 
In order to compare perceptions of leadership responsibility, we undertook a two-
part study. We first engaged Port of Providence business and government stakeholders in 
a survey that asked respondents to identify the organizations they saw as responsible for 
the planning and implementation of three long-term transformational strategies. We also 
asked respondents to assign responsibility to seven forms of leadership (Section 3.1) 
leadership, as follows: independent businesses, businesses in collaboration with each 
other, informal public-private collaboration, formal public-private collaboration, local 
(Providence and East Providence), state (Rhode Island), and federal lead. We used this 
information to identify organizations perceived to be responsible for resilience 
implementation. 
We then interviewed high-level managers from these respondent-identified leader 
organizations. We asked the managers to evaluate their organizations responsibility to 
facilitate leadership functions in implementing resilience strategies at the Port of 
Providence. We did this by using a framework, which describes the role of leadership in 
the implementation process. This framework is described in in Section 3.3. 
Throughout this paper “stakeholders” refers to the port of Providence stakeholder 
community, “participant” refers to those that participated in the Port of Providence 
workshop, “respondent” refers to those that responded to the Part 1 survey, and 
“interviewee” or “manager” refers to those interviewed in Part 2 and represent 




The Port of Providence is located south of downtown Providence at the mouth of 
Providence River and head of Narragansett Bay (Figure 1). The study area encompasses 
waterfront industrial business on both the Providence and East Providence side of the 
river. 
 
Figure  – The study area represented by the red boundary, includes Interstate-195, business along Allen’s Avenue and 




The port is critical to RI economy and the Rhode Island, Connecticut, and 
Massachusetts region (Providence Working Waterfront Association, 2008; ProvPort, 
2015; U.S. Energy Information Administration, n.d.) and is located in an exposed 
location to climate impacts including sea level rise and storm surge from hurricanes 
(Rubinoff, 2007). The governance structure of the port is complex, notably there is no 
operating port authority (Becker et al., 2014). Overlapping local and state zoning laws 
and regulations govern the port and approximately 30 independent businesses operate 
within the study area.  	 Stakeholders from the Port of Providence participated in previous planning and 
research efforts, of which this project forms a part. In August of 2015, 30 port 
stakeholders participated in a hurricane resilience workshop (from this point referred to 
as “the workshop”) that used tools and visualizations to introduce stakeholders to 
hurricane vulnerability and possible resilience strategies. The workshop initiated a 
dialogue within the port community. Using storm visualizations, stakeholders assessed 
impacts to the port in the weeks, months, and years following the storm scenario. We 
presented participants with three potential resilience concepts called Protect, Relocate, 
and Accommodate, which are explained in detail in Appendix 2B. 
 Workshop results concluded that participants were aware of the climate change 
risks their business face, however, there was no consensus on who is responsible for 
implementation of resilience strategies and who would pay for them in what time frame. 
Participants did evaluate resilience strategies and found that protecting the port (with 
some sort of barrier) best met their goals. There was also resistance to relocating port 
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infrastructure to less vulnerable locations, indicting that strategy is less feasible. For 
additional information on the study area see Appendix 2.  
3.1 Part I – Survey of Port Stakeholders 
 
 In order to understand which organizations port stakeholders perceive as 
responsible for adaptation leadership, we engaged 31 port stakeholders representing both 
the business and regulatory community around the Port of Providence. Twenty-six 
stakeholders responded to our survey and 25 completed the survey in full, 13 represented 
a business or non-government organization and 12 represented government. Of those who 
responded, nine reported operating facilities within the study area and 14 were interested 
in port operations for economic, regulatory, emergency response, or planning reasons. 
We asked the respondents a series of questions on the three long-term resilience 
strategies presented to them in the workshop, which are Protect, Relocate, and 
Accommodate (Appendix 4A). These represent three broad archetypal strategies that 
could be implemented at the port, as follows: 
Protect – This concept “protects” the port using large-scale infrastructure like a 
storm barrier located seaward of the port. This concept requires the construction of a 
barrier that would protect from some community-identified surge height. This concept, 
unless including a lock system, does not accommodate for impacts from sea level rise as 
this rise is passive, and the barrier will remain open to allow for navigation of commerce.  
Relocate – This concept moves some infrastructure out of locations deemed 
vulnerable by the community during the planning. Examples of infrastructure that could 
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be moved are chemical storage facilities (e.g., oil tanks), office space, and equipment 
storage facilities. This would require the purchase of off-port locations. 
Accommodate – This concept invests in improvements to port infrastructure in 
order to better withstand storm surge related impacts. Examples include elevating 
properties, elevating utilities and structures, utilizing floodable spaces and break through 
walls, and waterproofing structures. This strategy has the potential to accommodate for 
sea level rise, though this was not discussed in detail during the workshop. For additional 
information on the resilience concepts see Appendix 2B. 
Table	1	–	We	used	the	Forms	of	Leadership	to	evaluate	which	type	of	organization	is	responsible	for	the	
implementation	of	resilience	at	the	Port	of	Providence.	
Form of leadership Description 
Businesses independently Private businesses independently have sole responsibility for the 
implementation of resilience. 
Business in collaboration Private businesses collaborate to improve resilience collectively with 
no/little government support. 
Public-private informal 
collaboration 
Business and government working cooperatively to improve 




Public and private organizations work cooperatively in a Rhode 
Island legislature authorized/mandated body. An example of this is 
the Governor’s Commission of Dredging, formed by governor 
Lincoln Almond in 1996 (ESNR, 2008) 
Local lead (City of Providence 
and East Providence) 
City governments take a lead role in facilitating implementation of 
resilience in the study area. 
State lead (Rhode Island) The state of Rhode Island takes a lead role in facilitating 
implementation of resilience in the study area. 
Federal lead (United States) The U.S. federal government takes a lead role in facilitating 
implementation of resilience in the study area. 
 
 To investigate which organizations stakeholders perceive as responsible for 
implementing resilience strategies within the study area, we presented respondents with 
seven possible “leadership forms,” as follows, port business independently; port business 
in collaboration; public-private informal collaboration; public-private formal 
collaboration (i.e. special committee on port resilience); and local; state; and federal 
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lead. 	We developed these using the definition of leadership provided in Stiller and 
Meijerink (2015) and personal communications with policy experts (Fugate, 2016; 
Robadue, 2016). 
We asked respondents to assign the responsibility of these leadership forms to 
implement each of the resilience concepts (Protect, Relocate, and Accommodate). 
Stakeholders answered on a 1 – 5 scale: (1) not responsible at all, (2) less responsible 
than others, (3) just as responsible as others, (4) more responsible than others, and (5) 
entirely responsible. These scores were averaged to indicate how the group as a whole 
perceived the responsibility of each leadership form.  
 For each resilience strategy, we asked respondents which entities (person, 
organization, agency, business, etc.) they see as responsible for implementing resilience 
and tabulated the number of mentions each entity received as well as created word clouds 
using the online application Wordle.  
3.2 Part II – Interview of stakeholder perceived leaders 
In Part 1 of the study, respondents identified nine entities as leaders in our open-
ended questions, as follows: the city governments of Providence and East Providence, the 
Rhode Island Department of Transportation, the Department of Environmental 
Management, the Coastal Resources Council, Statewide Planning (part of the RI 
Department of Administration), CommerceRI, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and an 
organization that represents the Port of Providence business community. In part 2 of the 
study, we interviewed seven of the nine high-level managers of the entities identified in 
part 1, while two declined to be interviewed (Appendix 4C).  
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These managers are referred to as “interviewees” in the next sections; it is 
important to note, that respondents identified the organizations, while we identified a 
high-level manager that represents each organization. We asked organization managers to 
react to the word clouds created during Part 1 of the study (Figure 5). In the interviews, 
respondents discussed whether or not they perceived their organization to be in a 
leadership role for storm resilience. After recording initial reactions, we asked the 
interview subjects to evaluate their organizations responsibility to using the framework 
provided in Section 3.3. To follow up, we asked respondents what barriers they see that 
prevents their organization from moving forward in resilience implementation. In order to 
analyze interview transcripts we adapted a conceptual framework that describes the roles 
of leadership throughout the resilience policy process. For more information on interview 
analysis see Appendix 4D. 
3.3 Conceptual Framework 
In order to structure interview analysis, we adapted a framework (Stiller & 
Meijerink, 2015), through which we could evaluate each organization’s responsibility 
throughout the resilience planning and implementation process. To do this we combined 
a simple model of the policy process made up of three major steps, understanding, 
planning, and managing and the conceptual leadership functions framework in Stiller and 




Figure 1 – Leadership functions throughout the Policy Process - The Political Administrative Function, Enabling 
Function Adaptive Function, Dissemination Function, and Connective Function are facilitated by leadership 
throughout the policy process (understanding, planning, and managing). 
 
As described by Moser and Ekstrom (Moser & Ekstrom, 2010), understanding 
includes identifying problems and measuring their potential impact on a system. Planning 
involves identifying potential resilience options, assessing the feasibility, costs, and 
benefits, and selecting the optimal option. And managing entails installing, monitoring, 
and evaluating the selected resilience option. In this paper, we discuss “implementation” 
as a combination of the three phases of the policy process.  
Throughout the resilience planning process, leaders provide five functions that 
help facilitate the policy process and deliver the process from one stage to the next 
(Stiller & Meijerink, 2015), as follows: 
1. Political-administrative function – consists of “every day” actions taken to 
facilitate the management of the policy process such as making decisions on 
strategy options and designating funding sources for selected strategies. 
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2. Enabling function – motivates progress by instilling a sense of urgency, though 
initiating discussions and setting deadlines. 
3. Adaptive function – creates new ideas and process, as well as solutions to exposed 
barriers. This function allows the organization to change structurally to meet 
external changes and forces. 
4. Dissemination function – provides information on new ideas, problems, and 
solutions to resilience partners and collects information from partners and 
incorporates them into decision-making. 
5. Connective Function – incorporates stakeholders into a collective group. It 
provides connections between stakeholders by initiating meetings and work 
sessions and by engaging new stakeholders. 
 
We used this framework to evaluate how high-level managers perceived their 
organization’s leadership role both temporally (or throughout the resilience planning 
process) and functionally (in the facilitation of leadership functions). For additional 
information on adaptation leadership see Appendix 3, for more information on methods 




4.1 Survey respondents see a collaborative effort as necessary for implementing 
resilience strategies 
 Results from Part 1 of the study address Research Question 1. Survey 
respondents identified their initial opinions about what form of leadership is responsible 
for the implementation of resilience. Results indicated that they perceive a public-private 
informal collaboration as the optimal choice to lead resilience implementation, though 
they also supported a state lead effort (Figure 3). In this part, we averaged the 1-5 scaling 
described in our methods. A score of 1, the lowest possible score, indicated that the 
stakeholder group did not see that organization as responsible. A score of 5, the highest 
possible score, indicates complete responsibility. Three, being the mid-point, indicated 
that scales were neutral on the leadership structures responsibility to lead.  
Respondents felt that a public-private informal collaboration is most responsible 
to implement resilience with the average of responses evaluating it as more responsible to 
entirely responsible (this is represented as a score of greater than four, Figure 3). State 
led leadership also scored highly and is the second choice for leadership by the 
stakeholders (Figure 3). On the other hand, respondents do not see private business 
independently or private businesses in collaboration as responsible to implement 
resilience strategies. Average scores lower than three, shown in Figure 3, indicate this.   
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Figure 2 – Public-private informal collaboration received an average score of greater than four; the only other form of 
leadership above four is state lead. A score of one indicates “not responsible at all”, two indicates “less responsible”, 
three indicates “just as responsible as others”, four indicates “more responsible than others”, and five indicates 
“entirely responsible”.. 
 
4.2 Stakeholders from different sectors (public vs. private) have different ideas about 
which organization should be responsible for leading resilience actions 
 Though stakeholders collectively see a collaborative effort as responsible there 
were disagreements between public and private stakeholders when presented with 
different resilience strategy options. For example, private sector respondents hold 
different opinions than public sector respondents when it comes to identifying 
responsibility for the accommodate strategy (Figure 4). Business respondents tend to see 
government-centric leadership structures as more responsible than business-centric 
leaderships structures. This is indicated by scores greater than three (meaning tending to 




























 On the other hand, respondents representing public organizations tend to see 
business-centric leadership structures as more responsible, as indicate by scores greater 
than three for private businesses independently and private business in collaboration. 
This is an example in which private respondents see public leadership structures as 
responsible for resilience implementation, whereas government respondents see private 
leadership structures as responsible. It is important to note; however, that the highest 
average score is for both public-private informal collaboration and state lead.  
These findings align with the work of Karlesson et al. (2011), who observed that 
geographic location; stakeholder’s roles and characteristics; and the options in question 
presented to stakeholders, influenced how stakeholders perceived responsibility of 
climate negotiation (Karlsson et al., 2011). In the case of the Port of Providence, we see 
that respondents perceive the responsibility of leading resilience action differently, this is 
likely based on various factors, including whether or not their organization is located 
within the study area, who they represent (public or private organization), and which 
resilience strategy they are presented with. 
Next, we explored how respondents perceive responsibility for implementing each 
of the three resilience concepts individually. We were interested in seeing whether or not 





Figure 3 – Public stakeholders tend to see private-centric leadership structures as responsible, while private 
stakeholders tend to see public-centric stakeholders as responsible. A score of one indicates “not responsible at all”, 
two indicates “less responsible”, three indicates “just as responsible as others”, four indicates “more responsible than 
others”, and five indicates “entirely responsible”. 
Open-ended questions asking stakeholders who is responsible for leading the 
implementation of accommodate, relocate, and protect, showed that stakeholders 
perceive 36 different organizations as responsible (Figure 5).  
Overall stakeholders listed numerous organizations as having responsibility for 
the various strategy options (Figure 5). When comparing implementation responsibility 
for accommodate, relocate, and protect we see that respondents felt that “Businesses”, 
along with the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, should be 
responsible for implementing accommodate strategies. They felt that the City 
Governments and CommerceRI should be responsible for implementing relocate 
strategies. Finally, they felt that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the State of 






































Figure 4 – Different organizations were identified as responsible for each resilience strategy: 
a.) # of Unique organizations mentioned by respondents - 21; Total Mentions - 46; RI Government (8), 
Federal Government (6), USACE (6), RICRMC (4), RIDEM (4), City Government (3), Public (2), RI 
Statewide Planning (1), Collaboration (1), URI (1), CommerceRI (1), ProvPort (1), City Planning (1), Save 
the Bay (1), FEMA (1), Private (1), Mass Government (1), RIDOT (1), Business (1), URICRC (1);  n = 25.  
b.) # of unique organizations mentioned by respondents - 21; Total mentions - 49; City Government (8), 
CommerceRI (5), Business (4), RICRMC (4), None (no organization) (4), Rhode Island Statewide Planning 
(3), Federal Government (3), RIDEM (3), RIDOT (2), ProvPort (2), RI Government (2), Collaboration (1), 
Courts (1), Public (1), URI (1), Save the Bay (1), City Planning (1), Government (1), Port of Providence 
(1), Public-Private Formal Committee * (1), USACE (1);n = 25.  
c.) # of unique orgs - 24; Total Votes - 45; Business (5), RIDEM (5), Collaboration* (4), RICRMC (4), City 
Government (3), RI Statewide Planning (2), EPA (2), USACE (2), FEMA (2), Providence Working 
Waterfront (1), URI (1), URICRC (1), RIDOT (1), Federal Government (1), None (1), NOAA (1), 
Governor’s Office (1), USCG (1), Public (1), Port of Providence (1), Petroleum Industry (1), Special 
Committee* (1), Public-Private Committee* (1); n = 25. 
It is difficult to define where leadership for resilience implementation rests, 
because there are so many stakeholders of the Port of Providence and so many options for 
building resilience to climate change. Our results show that 36 different organizations, 
spanning public and private; local, state, and federal, are seen by respondents as having 
responsibility to lead in resilience implementation. Though some organizations received 
more mentions than others, our study provides empirical evidence that there is a lack of 
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consensus amongst port stakeholders when it comes to determining which entity should 
take a leadership role. This leaves an institutional void when it comes to resilience 
implementation. This has led to a situation in which no entity has taken action because no 
entity is mandated to take on the problem. For a list of acronyms used in survey analysis 
please see Appendix 5. 
4.3 Perceived leaders felt they were leaders, but not entirely 
 Results from interviews in Part 2 of the study addressed Research Question 2. 
They show that representatives of six of the seven managers interviewed stated that their 
organization is, in fact, a leader in resilience implementation. These representatives 
characterized their leadership in two ways: One group perceived their organization as a 
leader, but with limits to its ability to implement change at the Port of Providence. The 
second group felt that their entity could participate in leadership activities, but not be a 
sole “leader.” For example one respondent after stating their leadership role said, “We do 
have a direct role. I see us as a direct participant.”  
 When we asked interviewees to evaluate their role in the resilience 
implementation process, we found that no representative felt that their organization 
fulfilled all of the five functions of leadership throughout the policy process 
(understanding, planning, and managing; Section 3.3). For example two interviewees felt 
that their organizations held responsibility for fulfilling the dissemination, adaptation, 
and connective functions during the planning phase for climate resilience; however, they 
felt that they had no role in the managing phase and that the responsibility for leading 
implementation would thus need to be passed to someone else.  
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Similarly, another manager felt that, for the protect strategy in particular, their 
organization is responsible for the managing phase but not for the planning phase of that 
project. This suggests that the resilience strategy we presented interviewees with also 
impacted their perception of the organizations responsibility. Another representative 
stated that their organization focused on the dissemination of information to help port 
businesses understand their risk, this suggests the organization sees themselves as 
fulfilling the dissemination function during the understanding phase of the policy 
process, but not any other functions and they felt no responsibility in the planning or 
managing phase.  
Only one representative indicated that their organization held responsibility to 
complete all of the leadership functions; however, this organization only indicated it 
could complete these functions during the planning phase and was less sure about its role 
in the managing phase. The least discussed by managers and least fulfilled functions 
where the enabling function and the political and administrative function. These 
functions allocate funds as well as motivate and set deadlines for other stakeholders 
participating in the process, suggesting that this may inhibit action toward resilience 
implementation at the Port of Providence.    
These results indicate that no one leader fulfills all the leadership functions 
throughout the policy process from understanding to managing. However, it is shown that 
each organization plays a role in resilience implementation. This is an example of 
fragmentation, a barrier described in Section 2.2.2, because multiple organizations can 
influence the process and take the lead. However, who should take the lead is unclear, 
because so many organizations are involved. This lack of continual and clear leadership 
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results in the fragmentation of responsibility. It is not clear who should be acting at what 
phase, or who is responsible for what part of resilience implementation.  
4.4 Leaders face barriers that affect their perception of leadership responsibility 
 To answer Research Question 3 about barriers to leadership, we asked 
interviewees what barriers they felt were inhibiting their actions on resilience 
implementation. We identified four barriers that inhibited leadership organizations from 
taking a leadership role at the Port of Providence; they are 1) expertise, 2) jurisdiction, 3) 
lack of resources, and 4) lack of mandates/authorization. These barriers impacted some of 
the leaders’ perception of their organizations role in leading the resilience process making 
them see their organization as less responsible, because they faced one or more of these 
barriers.  
4.4.1 Expertise 
 We found that interviewees did not feel that their organizations had the skills or 
expertise to fulfill one or more of the leadership functions necessary to plan and 
implement resilience. We asked specifically how they felt their organization could fulfill 
each of the five leadership functions for climate resilience described in Section 3.3. For 
example, one interviewee felt that their organization could not complete the connective 
function because, their organization had no history of bring groups of collaborators 
together and did not know who should be involved, stating that, “A limitation is our [lack 
of] understanding of all of the players”. The time horizons involved in implementing 
climate resilience also factored into interviewee’s perceptions of their organizations 
mandate or expertise. Only one organization stated that they could plan or operate within 
the 50-100 year into the future time period, in which many of the major impacts of 
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climate change are likely to be felt. One leader stated, “Resiliency is not something that is 
going to be addressed by one organization” meaning that for this leader, it was going to 
take a collaborative effort, with multiple organizations with multiple skill sets, access to 
resources, and of different jurisdictions to improve the resilience of the port.   
4.4.2 Jurisdiction/scope 
 Interviewees reported that they felt their organizations were limited by their 
jurisdiction and/or their scope, when it came to planning for climate resilience for the 
Port of Providence. Some organizations were limited to working within in a unit smaller 
than the study area. For example, one leader stated, “Yes we take a lead role within the 
City limits, [but not beyond].” This representative said that within their city they had the 
ability to take the lead; however, they would need to be part of a larger collaborative 
effort if the entire Port of Providence (which includes both the City of Providence and 
East Providence) were included in a major planning effort.  
Other interviewees felt that planning at the port scale was too small of a unit to 
work, stating, “We have taken [a leadership role]… for the entire coastline, including in 
Providence Harbor, [but we do not focus specifically on any one location].” Another 
organization explained that their long-term resilience planning work was spread 
throughout the state, “Yes, [we have] taken a high-level leadership role in Providence 
Harbor as well as other locations.” They stated that if port business stakeholders reached 
out to them they would be able to input information into the planning process, but they 
would not take the initiative to begin a planning process without being approached by an 
entity more directly linked to the study area. This interviewee followed up to saying that 
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at a lack of resources also limited their participation in planning for climate resilience at 
the Port of Providence. 
4.4.3 Lack of resources 
 In fact, a lack of resources turned out to be a recurring theme. Every interviewee 
stated that the lack of resources limited their organization’s ability to lead in the 
resilience planning and implantation process at the port of Providence. Below are three 
examples of interviewee statements about this issue.  
“Funding is always an issue, if we don’t have the resources to complete the job correctly 
then that is a barrier.” 
“Funding, authority, and appropriation barriers, we can’t just go out and do anything we 
want” 
“Resources are always an issue, [we] are always spread everywhere thin, personnel and 
financial.” 
The lack of personnel and financial resources heavily impacted how leaders 
perceived their organization’s role at the port. All managers of perceived leader 
organizations expressed the need for more money and more personnel if their 
organization was going to take a lead role in climate adaptation for the Port of 
Providence. One manager expressed the importance of a resilience grant process as a way 
to provide resources, suggesting that grants incentivize the participation of businesses, 
government, and non-governmental organizations (including universities).  
4.4.4 Lack of mandates/authorization 
 Interviewees discussed how they often rely on the actions of others before acting 
themselves and that the resilience planning process needs a catalyst to begin.  Two 
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interviewees, one state (Rhode Island) and one federal, stated that though their 
involvement was within their jurisdiction a lack of authorization from legislative 
organizations inhibited their leadership at the Port of Providence. An interviewee stated, 
“…If we are going to impose change… it would take specific authority to require that.” 
Other interviewees stated that though not totally in their jurisdiction but if mandated by 
law, their organization would be motivated to take a lead role in resilience 
implementation at the port, particularly if grant funding was provided to conduct the 
work. Another interviewee stated, “Funding, authority, and appropriation barriers, we 
can’t just go out and do anything we want.”  
4.5 Managers see opportunities to collaborate as motivation and chance to clarify roles 
Interviewees explicitly stated the need for dialogue to help motivate their 
organization into a leadership role. Along with access to funding, leaders stated, 
“opportunities to cooperate”, “a group that was constantly driving discussion”, and “it 
is helpful to have things like the workshop to help remind [us of potential risks] and give 
ideas.” One interviewee mentioned the Port of Providence workshop conducted prior to 
this research as a valuable motivating force. This aligns with other findings in other work 
in which dialogue between stakeholders instilled ownership in the process as well as 
increased trust and motivated participation (Douglas et al., 2011). Pre-planning 
opportunities, like the workshop and the process described in Douglas et al. (2011) 
motivate participation.  
Interviewees also suggested that pre-planning dialogue helps clarify leader roles. 
One interviewee stated that conversation with other Port of Providence stakeholders 
allowed them “to see what other people do”. This same interviewee previously 
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mentioned that they did not know “all the players”. This suggests that pre-planning 
would allow for representatives of leadership organizations to see what other 
organizations do so managers can evaluate what roles their organization plays and when 
in the process. Pre-planning opportunities provide clarification of the feasible and 
stakeholder community supported resilience options (Becker, In press). One interviewee 
stated that they did not know how to act because they did not know what resilience 
strategy was likely to be implemented. Pre-planning can provide the opportunity for 
managers of perceived leadership organizations to interact with a portfolio of plausible 
resilience options; this helps clarify their leadership roles and when they need to take 








Though representatives of all of the perceived leader organization described 
playing a leadership role for the implementation of resilience strategies, no interviewee 
felt that their organization was solely responsible for the entire implementation process. 
In this case study, we found that port stakeholders represented in a survey identified 
seven possible organizations as “responsible for climate resilience implementation.” 
However, when managers of the seven organizations were interviewed, none was willing 
to assume such a leadership role alone. Interviewees identified multiple barriers that 
inhibited their leadership, including misaligned jurisdiction, unclear mandates, a lack of 
resources, and a lack of expertise.  
We also found that when comparing public and private stakeholders, each group 
perceived different members of the community as responsible for resilience 
implementation. When we compared perceptions around three different resilience 
strategy alternatives, we found that respondents felt that different leaders were 
responsible for the implementation of different types of resilience strategies. For 
“protecting” the port with the construction of a storm barrier, respondents felt that the 
state government should lead. If the port were to implement a “relocate” strategy to try to 
move uses out of the floodplain area, then respondents thought that a public - private 
collaboration should be formed to implement. Finally, “accommodating” existing uses 
should fall on the private sector for investment and implementation.  
The sheer number of stakeholders involved in planning for the port, further 
contributes to an institutional void and fragmentation of leadership responsibility. Survey 
respondents representing port stakeholders mentioned 36 unique organizations with 
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responsibility to lead resilience implementation. This contributes to institutional void 
because it is unclear who should be leading or who should be deciding. There is also no 
formal decision making process. Results showed that though all organizations 
interviewed play a role it is unclear who plays what role and when. This contributes to 
fragmentation of leadership responsibility.  
 Our results provide evidence of the importance of informal pre-planning dialogue 
in order to motivate and clarify leadership roles. Interviewees specifically discussed the 
Port of Providence workshop (a pre-planning exercise) as a motivating factor to their 
participation, stating that future collaborative opportunities would motivate their 
participation. Pre-planning dialogue allows for ownership to be taken (Moser & Ekstrom, 
2011), cultivates trust and participation (Douglas et al., 2011), and as our results suggest 
allow for those perceived responsible to lead to “see what other people do”. This helps 
clarify the many roles (or functions) that perceived leader organizations must take. Pre-
planning processes allow for discussion of politically, economically, and socially feasible 
resilience options (Becker, In press), this discussion allows for further clarification of 
leadership roles.   
Dialogue held during pre-planning processes can reduce the impact of and help 
navigate around barriers (Douglas et al., 2011), because it allows for the transaction of 
information from one organization to another (Tribbia & Moser, 2008).   Even though 
this type of exercise requires funding and prioritization by multiple stakeholders in the 
community, future dialogue, however, is critical so that roles may be clarified, 
alternatives agreed upon, and responsibility for action may be taken. 
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Appendix 1: Appendix Introduction 
  The appendixes below describe in greater detail aspects of this thesis. They 
provide greater detail on the Port of Providence and the Port of Providence Stakeholder 
Workshop, the storm scenario and resilience strategies used during the workshop, a 
literature review on the definition of adaptation leadership, addition methods, and 
additional results that were obtained. We also provide a copy of the survey and copy of 
the interview script.  
Appendix 2: Port of Providence 	 This appendix provides more information on the Port of Providence as well as the 
Port of Providence stakeholder workshop that took place in August of 2015. A team of 
URI researchers that include Austin Becker, Richard Burroughs, Duncan McIntosh, and 
Eric Kretsch conducted this workshop. This project was a Rhode Island Department of 
Transportation, URI Transportation Center, and Federal Highway Administration funded 
grant.. Appendix 2A provides more background on the Port of Providence and it’s 
importance to the regional economy. Appendix 2B provides more detail on the Port of 
Providence stakeholder workshop. It also provides more information on the storm 
scenario and resilience strategies presented to workshop discussed in this thesis. 
Appendix 2A: Port of Providence Background  
(Authors: Eric Kretsch, Austin Becker, Richard Burroughs, and Duncan McIntosh) 
The study area for this project includes ProvPort, the main port terminal, and 23 
other waterfront businesses and industries, which together, take up nearly 573 acres of 
waterfront in Providence and East Providence (Becker et al., 2010). ProvPort itself sits on 
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nearly 105 acres of land that are owned by the City of Providence and operated by a five 
board member nonprofit organization, which contracts the services of Waterson 
Terminals LLC to operate and maintain the Port. ProvPort generated more than $200 
million in economic benefits for the region and over 2,400 jobs were attributed to port 
activities in 2009 (Providence Working Waterfront Association, 2010).  
The Port is located at the northern end of Narragansett Bay, an ecologically 
sensitive estuary that provides breeding grounds for marine life in the region. The length 
and orientation of Rhode Island’s Narragansett Bay, and its proximity to the Atlantic 
hurricane zone, make it susceptible to extreme storm surges from the southerly winds that 
are generated when a hurricane passes to the west of the Bay. As such, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) considers Providence to be the “Achilles heel 
of the Northeast” (Rubinoff, 2007). The most recent major storm, Hurricane Carol in 
1954, produced 14.5 feet of storm surge in Providence. Most of the port lands in the 
study area are 3-10 feet above mean high water. A 25 foot hurricane barrier north of the 
port protects the downtown Providence area, but could result in higher storm-surge levels 
just south of the barrier at the port, as surge waters would accumulate in Providence 
Harbor instead of spreading throughout the low-lying region now protected inland of the 
barrier. 
Appendix 2B: Port of Providence Workshop (Hurricane Scenario and Resilience 
Concepts) 
(Authors: Eric Kretsch, Austin Becker, Richard Burroughs, and Duncan McIntosh)  
 
 In August of 2015, the Port of Providence business and government stakeholder 
group participated in a half-day workshop to discuss port vulnerabilities and also discuss 
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potential long-term transformation resilience concepts that could be employed within the 
port. Since 1851, 37 hurricanes have passed within 50 miles of Rhode Island (Rhode 
Island Emergency Management Agency, 2014), which corresponds to a 22.8 % chance of 
a hurricane approaching Rhode Island in a given year. In the past 100 years, Providence 
suffered two near-direct hit, from the unnamed Hurricane of 1938 and Hurricane Carol in 
1954. 
During the Port of Providence stakeholder workshop, researchers from the 
University Of Rhode Island Department Of Marine Affairs presented workshop 
participants with a storm scenario and visualizations to enhance dialogue between 
participants. We developed a scenario using input from a project steering committee. We 
identified a worst-case category three hurricane, using Sea, Lake, Overland Surges from 
Hurricane modeling (SLOSH) to identify potential surge heights. In this scenario the 
storm hit at high tide and caused a 21ft surge, just below the design height of the Fox 
Point Hurricane Barrier located north of the Port of Providence (Figure 13). We presented 
storm scenario images and images of the resilience strategies to promote dialogue 




Figure 5 - Image of hurricane storm scenario; this image depicts ProvPort proper (Image: Duncan McIntosh). 
	
Figure 6 - Image of hurricane storm scenario; this image depicts Motiva Enterprise's tank farm, west of Allen's 
Ave (Image: Duncan McIntosh) 
	37	
 
Figure 7 - Surge generated by hurricane storm scenario. Based on RIGIS, 2013 DEM derived from a 1-meter 




 During the workshop, we also presented port stakeholders with concepts that 
represent three different long-term transformation resilience concepts to increase port 
resilience. These are hypothetical concepts; a mixture these strategies would likely be 
necessary to build resilience at the port of Providence. 
Accommodate  
The “Accommodate” (Figure 8) concept proposed a suite of strategies that allow 
businesses to remain in place, but enhance resilience through upgrading, hardening, 
elevating and flood-proofing infrastructure and buildings (see e.g., (MassPort, 2014) . 





uses that could be operational upon receding of the flood. Through smart planning and 
improved practices, debris impacts could also be limited, decreasing physical and 
environmental damage. The “Accommodate” concept proposed a major investment on a 
property-by-property basis. Options that were discussed included: 
• Elevating buildings 
• Constructing breakaway walls 
• Flood-proofing utilities 
• Creating floodable first floors  
• Elevating land under structures 
• Elevating critical utilities (e.g., power, water, sewer)  
• Raising backup generators, air conditioning units and oil or gas tanks above the 
base flood elevation or onto roof of building 
• Flood-proofing building foundations  
• Using flood/salt water tolerant construction materials 
• Sealing around utility entry points 
• Installing waterproof bulkheads 
• Installing pumps with backup generators to pump out access water 
• Reinforcing windows and doors  
• Covering piles of material with debris tarps and strapping 





The “Protect” concept (Figure	9) reduces storm risk by decreasing the probability 
of occurrence of impacts (Tol et al., 2008). To do so, it proposes relocating the existing 
Hurricane Barrier to a new location, south of Fields Point, which would protect the Port 
of Providence area. The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) constructed 
the existing barrier in the 1966 to protect the downtown Providence area (USACE, 2007). 
However, the barrier leaves exposed all the maritime infrastructure in the study area, as it 
is located seaward of the barrier. The “Protect” concept envisions the construction of a 





Port of Rotterdam, at Fields Point along the southern edge of the study area. The Protect 
design concept would span the mouth of Providence Harbor, tying into the existing 
elevation in Providence and East Providence. The floodgate could be closed in the event 
of a storm, effectively protecting Providence Harbor from forcing associated with 
hurricane level storm surge and wave action. When open, the gates would rest on dry 
docks on the east and west sides of the harbor entrance. To close the gates the arms 
would be floated so that they may swing closed to meet in the center of the channel. A 
multipurpose levee located along the shoreline incorporates an earth berm and green wall 
along the landside, and a living shoreline along the waterside. A pedestrian/bike path 
might run along the top of the levee, and bleachers could be located on a portion of the 
landward side for viewing the adjacent sports fields. 
Relocate  
Relocate (Figure 11), also called “retreat” in climate change literature, reduces the 
impact of a storm event by limiting the potential negative effects through moving 
structures away from the flood plain (Tol et al., 2008). Historically, relocation has 
occurred after an event, when structures are damaged, abandoned, and rebuilt in an area 
further from shore or more protected . Relocation may be more appropriate for non-water 
dependent uses such as residential housing, as opposed to water dependent coastal 
infrastructure. However, in some cases infrastructure such as lighthouses (e.g., Cape 
Hatteras Light in North Carolina) have been moved back away from an eroding bluff. 
The “Relocate” concept proposed moving some or all of the current industrial uses in 
Providence Harbor out of harm’s way. It suggested that other locations around 
Narragansett Bay could provide a less exposed area from which to do business, while still 
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providing the infrastructure requirements such as access to highway, rail, navigation 
channels, pipelines, to operate. The current Exxon Mobil petroleum facility in East 
Providence provided an example of such a location, where the berthing facility is located 
along the water’s edge but the petroleum product is piped upland and stored in a tank 
farm located well away from the floodplain at an elevation of 50 feet  
	





Appendix 3: Literature related to the definition of adaptation leadership  	 In this appendix, we will discuss leadership in regards to adaptation and introduce 
the concept of “adaptation leadership.” Leadership takes many forms and can be defined 
in many ways (Meijerink & Stiller, 2013; Moser & Ekstrom, 2010, 2011; Stiller & 
Meijerink, 2015). However adaptation leaders, defined here as “those that will implement 
climate resilience strategies in complex systems such as ports” can be thought to possess 
certain behaviors like articulating a vision and stimulating intellectual thought and also 
thought to complete specific functions like setting deadlines and locating and allocating 
resources (Podsakoff et al., 1990; Stiller & Meijerink, 2015).  
Defining leadership 
Adaptation leadership can play a key role in navigating adaptation barriers such as 
a lack of mandates, resources, information, and authorization to act (Moser & Ekstrom, 
2010). Further, a lack of leadership can exacerbate such barriers to action. Adaption 
leadership can help to find consensus and make decisions in complex communities with 
multiple levels of government in which many stakeholders have multiple adaptation 
options (Becker, 2016; Biesbroek et al., 2013; Karlsson et al., 2011; Vogel et al., 2007)  
 Functions of Adaptation Leadership 
 To meet the climate change challenge, strong adaptation leadership is expected to 
enhance the development and selection of resilience options (Stiller & Meijerink, 2015). 
So-called “transformational adaptation”, which are large scale changes that transform 
places, like storm barriers or relocating vulnerable infrastructure, may require even 
greater input from leadership due to the system-wide issues it presents (Kates et al., 
2012). Research suggests stakeholders at all levels, local to national and including 
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business, knowledge institutions, and government officials must communicate to 
transform impacted systems (Kates et al., 2012). Leadership can play a major role in 
these transformations by providing the ability to maneuver around adaptation barriers 
(Meijerink & Stiller, 2013; Moser & Ekstrom, 2010; Stiller & Meijerink, 2015).  
Adaptation leadership does not always conform to the typical hierarchical forms 
of leadership where “an often charismatic, positional leader (someone with a formal 
leadership position) succeeds in getting followers for his ideas” (Stiller & Meijerink, 
2015, p. 2). Adaptation leadership lies often in organizations or a group of individuals or 
organizations and is also transferable from one organization to another (Stiller & 
Meijerink, 2015). Such an organization(s) is responsible for fostering transformational 
change.  
Podaskoff et al. (1990) discusses behaviors of transformational leaders. Since 
resilience implementation is a transformational process, we can expect that an adaptation 
leader will display six behaviors (Podsakoff et al., 1990), these are: 
1. Identifying and articulating a vision – Identifies new opportunities for the future; 
presenting to followers and inspiring followers to reach new vision. 
2. Providing an appropriate model – Provides a model of behavior and action that 
followers can emulate. 
3. Fostering the acceptance of group goals – Promotes cooperation among members 
of the group in order to motivate the group to work towards group-established 
goals. 
4. High performance expectations – Expects more from group members than what is 
or has been standard practice. 
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5. Providing individualized support – Shows caring and respect for individual 
members opinions, struggles, and needs. 
6. Intellectual stimulation – Provides an environment that stimulates followers to re-
evaluate their way of operating and allows for changes in follower behavior.  
  Leader behaviors enhance follower or actor trust and satisfaction with the process 
(Podaskoff et al., 1990). Actors must be satisfied with the process in order to be involved. 
Adaptation leader behaviors are only one aspect of adaption leadership; adaptation 
leadership facilitates functions that motivate and sustain the policy process. Behaviors 
and functions of leaders are important to understand in order to analyze how Port of 
Providence actors and leaders perceive leadership roles in the port community. 
 Stiller and Meijerink (2015) developed a model of adaptation leadership functions 
that facilitate the development and implementation of resilience options. Leadership in 
this model is not confined to a “top-down” authoritarian structure, often strong leadership 
is presented by organizations that allow for the development of new ideas and practices 
(Stiller & Meijerink, 2015). Leaders create resilience policy by investing human and 
financial resources; setting deadlines and establishing an urgency to work; changing the 
work environment or operation routines, translating new ideas into policy, and organizing 
actors in a stable working group (Stiller & Meijerink, 2015). Stiller and Meijerink’s 
model consist of five adaptive leadership functions the political-administrative function, 
the enabling function, the adaptive function, the dissemination function, and the 
connective function. Adaptation leaders by facilitating these five functions to reduce the 
impact of barriers to adaptation (Moser & Ekstrom, 2010). In other research, we see 
examples of the disseminative and connective functions. In Vogel et al. (2007), Tribbia 
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and Moser (2008), and Kahan (2010) we see examples of the disseminative and 
connective functions and a discussing of discuss various aspects related to these 
functions. 
Vogel et al. (2007) and Tribbia and Moser (2008) focus on a decision-maker’s 
abilities to incorporate science into decision-making. This work clarifies how climate 
adaptation knowledge is developed between scientists and policy-practitioners. Vogel et 
al. (2007) discusses the “science-practice interface” and the importance of bridging gaps 
between scientists and practitioners so that informed decision-making can occur. This 
interface previously seen as linear from scientist to practitioner recently is described as 
dynamic, where information passes bi- directionally and each group is altered by the 
interaction (Vogel et al., 2007).  
We see that adaptation leaders provide this the link between science and practice via 
the dissemination and connective functions between decision-maker and scientist (Stiller 
& Meijerink, 2015; Tribbia & Moser, 2008). Stakeholders can provide localized 
knowledge that improves the quality of decisions. (Becker, 2016; Burroughs, 1999; 
Messner, Becker, & Adolf, 2016; Preston, Rickards, Fünfgeld, & Keenan, 2015). It is 
important to note again that many organizations may be adaptation leaders, because they 
facilitate various functions (Moser & Ekstrom, 2010; Stiller & Meijerink, 2015). 
Adaptation leaders must possess transformational leadership behaviors and facilitate 
various functions in the policy process. These Adaptation leadership behaviors and 
functions increase participation, trust, and motivate and sustain resilience 
implementation. This results in more optimal resilience outcomes ones that are 
politically, economically, and socially feasible. The leaders identified by Port of 
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Providence stakeholders may possess the traits of an adaptation leader. This study looks 
at how leaders facilitate the functions described in this section. 
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Appendix 4: Additional Methods  	 This appendix provides more information on survey and interview methods 
including the analysis of both survey and interview results. We also provide a copy of the 
survey used in Part 1 (Appendix 4A) of the study and a script of the interview used in 
Part 2 of the study (Appendix 4D).  
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Appendix 4B - Stakeholder Surveys Analysis 
 In the survey, respondents were asked to assign responsibility resilience strategy 
implementation of the three major concepts to the seven leadership forms. Stakeholders 
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answered on a 1 – 5 scale, this included (1) not responsible at all, (2) less responsible 
than others, (3) just as responsible as others, (4) more responsible than others, and (5) 
entirely responsible. We averaged responses in order to evaluate how the group as a 
whole sees the responsibility of each form of leadership.  
 The lowest average score possible is one; this means that all stakeholders see that 
form of leadership as “not responsible at all” for the implementation of the strategy. A 
score of three is the mid-point indicating stakeholders see that form of leadership just as 
responsible as everyone else. A score less than three indicates stakeholders see that 
organization less responsible, with lesser responsibility, as you get closer to one. A score 
of greater than 3 indicates that that form of leadership is more responsible than other, 
with greater responsibility as you get closer to five. Five is the max score, meaning that 
all stakeholders perceive that form of leadership as entirely responsible for the 
implementation of the given resilience strategy.  
 We analyzed open-ended questions by tabulating the number of mentions. We 
then used Wordle to develop word clouds. These word clouds are visual representations 
of the number of mentions each organization received. The larger the font the greater the 
number of mentions. Actual counts are located in the captions of each word cloud image. 
We used these word clouds in interviews to show high-level managers efficiently how 
stakeholders perceived their organization as well as other organizations. 	  
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Appendix 4C – Copy of Interview Script 




planning	at	the	Providence	Harbor?	5.3. If	yes;	5.3.1. Why	has	the	organization	not	stepped	into	this	role?	5.3.1.1. Incentives	5.3.2. What	would	motivate	your	organization	to	take	on	this	role?	5.3.2.1. Incentives	5.3.3. Do	you	perceive	any	barriers	that	keep	your	organization	from	taking	a	leadership	role?	5.4. If	no;	5.4.1. Why	does	your	organization	not	perceive	itself	as	responsible	for	a	leadership	position?	5.4.1.1. Barriers	5.4.2. Do	you	perceive	any	barriers	that	keep	your	organization	from	taking	a	leadership	role?		Thank	you	for	meeting	with	me	and	have	a	fantastic	day!		
Appendix 4D – Leader Interview Analysis 
Interviews with representatives of the seven leader organizations ranged from 10 
minutes long to 30 minutes long. We recorded these interviews and transcribed them 
using Microsoft Word. We printed these transcripts and analyzed the text using colored 
pencils in order to identify common themes. During analysis we identified:  
• Perceptions of their organizational responsibility for implementing resilience at 
the Port of Providence 
• Perceptions of their organizations role in leading other port stakeholders in 
planning and implementing resilience measures 
• Barriers and incentives.  
 
To ensure accuracy of analysis, we selected a random selection of transcription and had 
two other researchers from our group analyze the transcripts and identify themes. We 
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compared, conversed, and where need adjusted the analysis process and outputs to ensure 
consistency.  	  
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Appendix 5: Acronyms used in Word Cloud figures 	 This	appendix	shows	the	acronyms	used	in	the	analysis	of	open-ended	questions	asking	stakeholder	to	state	specific	organizations	responsible	for	resilience	implementation.	
Table	2	–	Acronyms	used	in	Word	Cloud	figures	
CityGov City Governments (City of Providence; City of East Providence) 
COTP Captain of the Port 
FedGov Federal Government 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
PEMA Providence Emergency Management Agency 
RICRMC Rhode Island Coastal Resources Council 
RIDEM Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management 
RIDOT Rhode Island Department of Transportation 
RIEMA Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency 
RIGov Rhode Island Government 
URI University of Rhode Island 
URICRC University of Rhode Island Coastal Resources Center 
USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers 
USCBP United States Customs and Border Patrol 
USCG United States Coast Guard 
USDHS United States Department of Homeland Security 
USEPA United States Environmental Protection Agency 
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Appendix 6: Additional Results 
In this appendix, we show additional results collected during the survey. Results augment 
the findings outlined in the results section of the main text.  
Figures 12, 13, 14, 15 show how survey respondents perceive the responsibility to 
lead of the 7 forms of leadership described in Section 3.1 in relation to what resilience 
strategy (i.e. resilience in general, protect, relocate, and accommodate) they are 
considering.  
Figures 16, 17, and 18 show results of the open-ended questions asking survey 
respondents to state specific entities responsible for resilience implementation at the port. 
The larger font organizations received more mentions.   









































Appendix 6B – Responsibility to implement Protect 
	
Figure 12 – State lead received the highest average score. A score of one indicates “not responsible at all”, two 
indicates “less responsible”, three indicates “just as responsible as others”, four indicates “more responsible than 


































Appendix 6C – Responsibility to implement Relocate 
	
Figure	13	–	Overall, all stakeholders only see a State Led form of leadership as responsible to implement Relocate. 
However, there is great disagreement between public and private stakeholders. A score of one indicates “not 
responsible at all”, two indicates “less responsible”, three indicates “just as responsible as others”, four indicates 





















































































Appendix 6F – Specific organizations responsible for Protect 
 
Figure	16	- # of Unique organizations mentioned by respondents - 21; Total Mentions - 46; RI Government 
(8), Federal Government (6), USACE (6), RICRMC (4), RIDEM (4), City Government (3), Public (2), RI 
Statewide Planning (1), Collaboration (1), URI (1), CommerceRI (1), ProvPort (1), City Planning (1), Save 
the Bay (1), FEMA (1), Private (1), Mass Government (1), RIDOT (1), Business (1), URICRC (1); n = 25. 
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Appendix 6G – Specific organizations responsible for Relocate 
	
Figure	17	-	# of unique organizations mentioned by respondents - 21; Total mentions - 49; City Government 
(8), CommerceRI (5), Business (4), RICRMC (4), None (no organization) (4), Rhode Island Statewide 
Planning (3), Federal Government (3), RIDEM (3), RIDOT (2), ProvPort (2), RI Government (2), 
Collaboration (1), Courts (1), Public (1), URI (1), Save the Bay (1), City Planning (1), Government (1), 
Port of Providence (1), Public-Private Formal Committee * (1), USACE (1); n = 25. 
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Appendix 6I – Specific organizations responsible for Accommodate 
 
Figure	18	-	# of unique orgs - 24; Total Votes - 45; Business (5), RIDEM (5), Collaboration* (4), RICRMC 
(4), City Government (3), RI Statewide Planning (2), EPA (2), USACE (2), FEMA (2), Providence Working 
Waterfront (1), URI (1), URICRC (1), RIDOT (1), Federal Government (1), None (1), NOAA (1), 
Governor’s Office (1), USCG (1), Public (1), Port of Providence (1), Petroleum Industry (1), Special 
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